We present a novel temporal illusion in which the perceived order of events is dictated by their perceived causal relationship. Participants view a simple Michotte-style launching sequence featuring 3 objects, in which one object starts moving before its presumed cause. Not only did participants re-order the events in a causally consistent way, thus violating the objective temporal order, but they also failed to recognise the clip they had seen, preferring a clip in which temporal and causal order matched. We show that the effect is not due to lack of attention to the presented events and we discuss the problem of determining whether causality affects temporal order at an early perceptual stage or whether it distorts an accurately perceived order during retrieval. Alternatively, we propose a mechanism by which temporal order is neither misperceived nor misremembered but inferred ''on-demand" given phenomenal causality and the temporal priority principle, the assumption that causes precede their effects. Finally, we discuss how, contrary to theories of causal perception, impressions of causality can be generated from dynamic sequences with strong spatiotemporal deviations.
Introduction
Imagine watching a long line of dominos falling one after another. Apparently, each domino's fall causes the fall of the next one in the line. But suddenly one domino falls early, before being touched by the previous domino (Fig. 1) . Would you notice that the domino had fallen prematurely?
Whether or not causal impressions can influence the experienced temporal order depends on two questions: (1) Can the perception of temporal order be influenced by information other than the order of the percepts themselves, and (2) do causal impressions possess those features necessary to influence presumably lower level percepts?
For some philosophers (Hoerl, 2013; Mellor, 1985; Phillips, 2014; Soteriou, 2010) , the answer to the first question is negative: according to the mirroring theory, the order of our experiences mirrors or inherits the temporal structure of the environment. Thus, to experience event A happening before B, we must be exposed to that particular temporal order, even if it is illusory, such as when lightning is seen before the thunder is heard. Others, however, have argued for a more constructed view of temporal order (Dainton, 2010; Grush, 2007) , i.e. for temporal order as a second-order judgement.
From a psychological perspective, the prior entry effect, the finding that attended stimuli are perceived earlier than unattended ones (Spence & Parise, 2010; Titchener, 1908 ) might seem at odds with the mirroring theory. This is because in prior entry the order of presentation does not match the perceived order. However, what matters to mirroring theory is the subjective order of presentation. What determines the experienced order is the time when successive stimuli (accelerated or delayed by attention) reach awareness, consistent with the mirroring theory of time perception (Vibell, Klinge, Zampini, Spence, & Nobre, 2007) .
Multisensory integration, on the other hand, suggests that the experienced temporal order is in fact malleable: when two successive bimodal stimuli are assumed to originate from the same source, the perceived timing of each stimulus is shifted so that the two events are experienced as being simultaneous (King, 2005; Spence & Squire, 2003) . Unlike the domino example, however, the order here is collapsed rather than reversed. Nevertheless, Stetson and colleagues (Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Eagleman, 2006) have combined multisensory integration with sensory adaptation to show that an initial adaptation to a short delay between an action and an outcome leads to an illusory experience of effects preceding their causes when that delay is subsequently reduced (see also Heron, Hanson, & Whitaker, 2009 
